🧩 What “Expected Move” Means
The expected move tells you how much the stock is expected to move (up or down) over a given period — based purely on option prices (i.e., implied volatility), not on direction.
It’s derived from the standard deviation implied by option prices — essentially, a 1σ (one standard deviation) move in probability terms.
That means:
There’s about a 68% probability the stock stays within ±1σ range over that time.
The Indian microfinance industry was once hailed as the most powerful tool for financial inclusion — small-ticket loans, group discipline, and high repayment rates made it look like a social and economic miracle. But beneath this seemingly robust model lies an uncomfortable truth few market participants want to acknowledge: the traditional microfinance engine — the local ring leader system — is breaking down.
And when the distribution engine fails, scalability vanishes.
On paper, microfinance runs on Joint Liability Groups (JLGs) — groups of 5–10 women taking collective responsibility for each other’s loans. In practice, this structure functions only because of a local intermediary — the ring leader or center leader — who brings together women from different sections of the village, helps form the JLGs, and coordinates weekly repayment meetings.
The field officer from the microfinance institution (MFI) depends completely on these ring leaders. They mobilize borrowers, maintain social discipline, and ensure repayment. In return, they earn an informal commission — often 5–10% of the loan disbursed.
This unofficial layer made the model scalable. Without it, disbursing and collecting thousands of small ₹30,000–₹50,000 loans in rural areas is operationally unviable.
In my view more than gold and silver rise, its the end game for crypto currency it seems. Too many digital numbers valued absurdly. 110000 dollar or around 1 crore for 1 bitcoin which is nothing but a number in computer.
Crypto bubble has lasted tool long and is bound to fall 99% like all bubble bursts and the smart investors and insiders are already shifting to gold and silver it appears. When crypto is worth nothing then to protect wealth their investors can buy gold at even 5 times price and will still be able to protect 20% of their holding in crypto.
There is some group who has cordinated and created this crypto mania and they eventually have to exit and shift to something tangible. In my view GOLD and silver sudden rise is the result of that crpto collapse which has just started.
Lets SEE!
| Bank | Crisis Period & Nature | Stock Crash | Turnaround Driver | Recovery & Returns | Key Learnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wells Fargo (U.S.) | (2016–2020) Fake accounts scandal, CEO resignation, $3B fine. | $60 → $22 (−63%) | CEO Charlie Scharf (ex-JPMorgan) focused on governance cleanup. | $22 → $60 (≈3x in 4 yrs) | Retail trust can return if culture + controls are rebuilt. |
| JPMorgan Chase (U.S.) | (Early 2000s, merger & risk scandal from derivatives exposure, “London Whale” 2012 loss) | $65 → $32 (−50%) | Jamie Dimon restored discipline, fortress balance sheet, strong risk management. | Became top global bank, $32 → $200+ | Culture, risk management, and leadership credibility define premium valuation. |
| Bank of America | (2008–2011) Countrywide & Merrill Lynch acquisitions; mortgage fraud, massive losses. | $55 → $5 (−90%) | CEO Brian Moynihan rebuilt capital, shed toxic assets, stabilized business. | $5 → $45 (≈9x in 10 yrs) | Balance sheet cleanup and capital rebuilding restore long-term confidence. |
| Citigroup | (2008 crisis & earlier frauds, recurring leadership turmoil) | $550 → $10 (split-adjusted) | Rebuilt under Vikram Pandit, then Michael Corbat, now Jane Fraser. | Partial recovery only | Cultural repair incomplete; franchise remains undervalued. |
| Standard Chartered (UK/Asia) | (2013–2016) Money-laundering violations, compliance issues, overexposure to risky EMs. | £19 → £4.5 (−75%) | CEO Bill Winters (ex-JPMorgan) restructured business, cut costs. | £4.5 → £8 (≈2x) | Emerging market focus needs strong compliance systems to regain trust. |
| Deutsche Bank (Germany) | (2010s–2019) Libor manipulation, money laundering, weak capital ratios. | €100 → €6 (−94%) | CEO Christian Sewing restored capital, exited investment banking exposure. | €6 → €14 (≈2.3x) | Credibility still rebuilding, but shows early signs of turnaround. |
| Bank | Crisis Low (Approx.) | Time to Double | 3-Year Return | 5-Year Return | Catalyst / Leadership |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wells Fargo | $22 (2020 COVID + scandal low) | ~10 months ($45 by 2021) | ~2.5× ($22→$55 by 2023) | ~3× ($22→$65 by 2025) | CEO Charlie Scharf; governance rebuild |
| JPMorgan Chase | $32 (2009 crisis low) | ~11 months ($64 by 2010) | ~2.5× ($32→$80 by 2012) | ~6× ($32→$190 by 2014) | Jamie Dimon’s “fortress balance sheet” era |
| Bank of America | $5 (2011) | ~14 months ($10 by 2012) | ~3.5× ($5→$18 by 2014) | ~9× ($5→$45 by 2019) | Brian Moynihan rebuilt capital, cost discipline |
| Standard Chartered | £4.5 (2016) | ~18 months (£9 by 2018) | ~2× | ~2.3× | CEO Bill Winters stabilized EM franchise |
| Deutsche Bank | €6 (2019) | ~24 months (€12 by 2021) | ~2.3× | ~2.5× | Christian Sewing restored capital & focus |
📍 Background
Britain’s first major speculative boom in industrial equities.
The trigger: 1843–1844 saw real success stories (Great Western, Midland, London & Birmingham).
Parliament approved over 1,000 railway companies and projects during the boom.
Many were paper companies with no track built — funded via deposits and leverage.
Between 1843–1846, the market capitalization of railway shares quadrupled.
1. Always go against tide. Buy when others are selling and sell when others are buying. 2. If you believe in the growth prospects o...
